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Abstract: 
 
Farrell and Shapiro proposed a simple test of the possible upward pricing pressure (UPP) 
following a merger. They showed that the test may give false negatives, that is, indicate that a 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Antitrust authorities receive a large number of merger notifications. Since they cannot 
scrutinize all mergers in detail, they need simple tools for accepting mergers that are not 
expected to have anti-competitive effects. Market shares and concentration ratios have 
traditionally been used as indicators. As explained in an article by Joe Farrell and Carl 
Shapiro (hereafter FS) these measures may be inaccurate in differentiated products’ 
industries.1 FS proposed an alternative screening tool called UPP (Upward Pricing Pressure) 
focusing directly on the merged firms’ incentives to raise post-merger prices. The test requires 
limited information, in particular it does not require demand or competitor data, it is based on 
sound economic logic, and it is an improvement compared to the detailed focus on market 
definition at present.2 
 
When a screen test gives a negative result, the merger will be cleared. A simple tool may err, 
however.  It may indicate anti-competitive effects when there would be none, i.e., a false 
positive result, or predict no price increase when the opposite would be true, which is a false 
negative result. If the screening leads to a false negative, one would clear a merger that should 
have been banned. This mistake will not be corrected later on. A false positive result, 
however, may be corrected in the subsequent and more detailed process. One should therefore 
be more concerned about false negatives than false positives. 
 
FS show that for symmetric firms the proposed UPP may lead to false negatives, but never 
false positives. We show that with asymmetric firms false positives may result and is more 
likely the more asymmetric firms are. Since mergers with a false positive UPP test can be 
                                                 
1 J. Farrell and C. Shapiro (Volume 10): Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to 
market definition, THE B.E. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, article 9, 2010. 
2 The proposed UPP framework has triggered a large debate, and not all the commentators regard this approach 
as novel and/or suitable in merger analysis.  For various views, see e.g. D. W. Carlton (Volume 6): Revising the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 619-652 (2010), M. 
B. Coate (Volume 7): Benchmarking the Upward Pricing Pressure Model with Federal Trade Commission 
Evidence, JOURNAL OF COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS, 825-846 (2011), J. E. Lopatka (Volume 
39): Market Definition?, REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 69-93 (2011), R. Willig (Volume 39): 
Unilateral Competitive Effects of Mergers: Upward Pricing pressure, Product Quality, and Other Extensions, 
REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 19-38 (2011), J. J. Simmons and M. B. Coate (Volume 6): 
Upward Pressure on Price Analysis: Issues and Implications for Merger Policy, EUROPEAN COMPETITION 
JOURNAL 377-396 (2010), R. J. Epstein and D. Rubinfeld (Volume 10): Understanding UPP, THE B.E. 
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, article 21 (2010), J. Farrell and C. Shapiro (Volume 10): 
Upward pricing pressure in horizontal merger analysis: Reply to Epstein and Rubinfeld, THE B.E. JOURNAL 
OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, article 41 (2010), S. Moresi: The use of upward pricing pressures indices 
in merger analysis, ANTITRUST, February 2010 (2010), and R. Schmalensee (Volume 12): Should new merger 
guidelines give UPP market definition?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE, (2009).  
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cleared during an in depth investigation while false negatives cannot be corrected, the 
argument in favor of the test proposed by Farrell and Shapiro is strengthened when we take 
into account the presence of asymmetric firms. 
 
2. THE UPP TEST 
 
The UPP test checks whether the merging parties - given stipulated reductions in marginal 
costs, called efficiencies - would have incentives to raise prices. Consider a case of two 
single-product, Bertrand price-setting firms. Let Pi, Ci, and xi denote respectively price, 
marginal cost, and the volume of product i, i=1,2.  Profit is (  -  )  -  i i i iP C x Fiπ = where Fi is 
fixed costs, and ( )–  /i i i iM P C P≡  is the margin on product i, i=1,2. Finally, let Dij, i≠j, 
denote the diversion ratio telling the fraction of diverted customers from product j that 
switches to product i because of a price increase of product j.  
 
In general, optimal pre- and post-merger prices will differ. Ceteris paribus, a merger gives 
merging firms an incentive to increase prices, while efficiencies do the opposite. Gregory 
Werden considered the necessary efficiencies (Ei) such that optimal post-merger prices were 
identical to the pre-merger prices.3 In such case, the competitors would have no incentive to 
increase their prices either, whereby volumes would remain unchanged, and the analyst can 
neglect both competitor and demand data.4 Werden developed the following condition  
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Rearranging (1) for i=1we get Werden’s notion of UPP (compare FS-eq. (7)):  
 
(2) UPPW1 ≡ ( ) ( ) ( )2112111121122212 1 DDCECPDDCPD −−−+−  
 
with a similar condition for i=2. FS define UPP as follows:  
                                                 
3 See G. Werden (Volume 44): A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of 
differentiated products, JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, 409-413 (1996). 
4 When there is an upward pricing pressure, however, and one wants to conduct a full analysis, demand and 
competitor data would be needed. 
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 (3) ( )1 12 2 2 1 -  UPP D P C E C≡ − 1
0=
 
 
(2) can be written 
 
(2’) UPPW1 =    1 12 21 1 1 1( (1 ))UPP D D P C E+ − −
 
(2’) is the correct expression for measuring the case of no upward pricing pressure as the 
feedback from the second product is incorporated. Lower marginal cost on one product 
implies that it is more profitable to pick up sales from the other product. This feedback effect 
will, all else equal, make it more profitable to raise prices after the merger. FS suggest using 
UPP1 as the screen and argue that its basic economic logic is more transparent than 
introducing simultaneous equations (as eq (2’) implies), and that it accords with their 
emphasis on simplicity and transparency. 
 
Divide by P2 in (3), transforming the screen into a unit-free measure, whereby the following 
condition signals an upward pricing pressure on product 1: 
 
(4) 2 212 1
1 11
M PD E
M P
>−  
 
Assume full symmetry, i.e., the two products have equal prices and marginal cost, and hence 
margins M1 = M2 = M, and in addition set D12 = D and E1 = E. Then (4) becomes  
  
(4’) E
M
MD >−1 . 
 
Considering both products FS find that there will be an upward pricing pressure if: 5 
  
(5) E
M
M
D
D >−− 11 . 
 
                                                 
5 With full symmetry diversion ratios (D12 = D21 = D) are equal and the efficiencies are the same (E1 = E2 = E). 
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Since D/(1– D) > D, (5) is more easily satisfied than (4’). That is, an upward pricing 
pressure is more likely if feedback effects are incorporated.  The UPP1 test (3) can therefore 
predict false negatives – no upward pricing pressure - where a more accurate test would 
predict an upward pricing pressure. The opposite – false positives – will never be the case.6 
 
If we relax the symmetry assumptions, however, false positives may emerge.7 Consider a case 
where the two products have identical parameters except for the diversion ratios between 
them, i.e., D12 ≠ D21. Focus on the net effect: Is there on average an upward pricing pressure? 
Eq. (2) is the condition for no change in P1, with a corresponding condition for P2. If both 
conditions are met: 
 
 ( )[ ] 01(12 211221122112 =−−−++ DDMEMDDMDMD  
 
Rearranging the condition, there will on average be an upward pricing pressure if: 
 
 (6) 
12 21
12 21
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The right hand side of (6) is identical to the right hand side of (4’), whereby we can compare 
the left hand sides of (4’) and (6). There is a larger scope for upward pricing pressure 
applying test (4’) than test (6) if: 
 
(7) 
12 21
12 21
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Rearranging terms, we find that (7) is true if:8 
 
                                                 
6 See Farrell and Shapiro, op.cit. 
7 Ø. Daljord and L. Sørgard (volume 31): Single-product versus uniform SSNIPs, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 142–146 (2011) show a similar mechanism with the critical loss test for market 
delineation. 
8 There are two solutions to (8) solved as an equality, but only one with D12 between 0 and 1. 
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Condition (8) is met if D12 is sufficiently large relative to D21. This is illustrated in Figure 1 
where the solid line shows when condition (8) holds with equality. 
 
 
D21
D12
 
Figure 1: The UPP1 test predicts false positives for values above the curve. 
 
For values of D12 and D21 above the curve in Figure 1, the UPP1 test in (4) indicates an 
upward pricing pressure while the accurate test in (2) does not. The intuition is that unequal 
diversion ratios D12 and D21 lead to different incentives to raise each of the two prices. There 
can be an upward pricing pressure on the product with a large diversion ratio and a downward 
pricing pressure on the product with the low diversion ratio. Combining the two, one may find 
that on average there is no upward pricing pressure. In contrast, there will be an upward 
pricing pressure if we allow for a price change on only the product with the large diversion 
ratio. Applying the UPP1 test on the product with the largest diversion ratio can therefore lead 
to a false positive. 
 
This is in line with the proposed procedure in FS. If there are mixed results, UPP1 > 0 while 
UPP2 < 0, the advice is to scrutinize this merger further. By doing so there is a risk of going 
along with some false positives. However, the subsequent full inquiry is then expected to 
clear a case where the screening led to a false positive. The costs of false positive tests in the 
screening phase will then be limited. 
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 Unequal diversion ratios are often the case where one product has lower sales than the other.9 
A large fraction of customers from the smaller product will be diverted to the larger product, 
while the small product only picks up a small fraction of customers diverted from the large 
product. Thus, after the merger there is a stronger incentive to raise the price on the small 
product than on the large product.10  
 
3. SOME NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
 
False positives may also result if there are other asymmetries than diversion ratios. Let us 
define , where v is the market share dependent weight on 
product 1. Apart from v, UPPw has 8 parameters: Pi, Ci, (or Mi), Ei, i=1,2, and D12 and D21. By 
taking ratios these are reduced to four parameters: p ≡ P1/P2, m ≡ M1/M2, e ≡ E1/E2, and d ≡ 
D12/D21, in addition to v.  
( )1  1w WUPP vUPP v UPP≡ + − 2W
 
Now we can compute border-lines for false positive in various two-dimensional spaces in the 
following way: Consider product 1 and find parameter-values that make UPP1 > 0, while at 
the same time make UPPw < 0. An efficiency gain E reduces any UPP, see eqs. (1) and (2). 
Thus we seek the smallest E1 that makes UPP1 > 0, and the largest E2 that makes UPPw < 0. 
In sum, we seek the smallest e ≡ E1/E2. 
 
Return to Figure 1 and symmetry except for diversion ratios, i.e., p = 1, m = 1, e = 1, and v = 
½. Let D12 = 0.2 and D21 = 0.1, which is a point above the curve with UPP1 > 0 and UPPW < 
0. Inserting values reveals that UPP1 = 0.009 > 0 and UPPW = -0.005 < 0, which signals false 
positive as suggested by the figure. 
 
Alternatively, let p = 1, d = 1, and v = ½, and consider the m-e-space. For a given m-value 
compute E1 and E2 values, and hence an e-value, such that UPP1 > 0, while UPPw < 0. See 
                                                 
9 In a study of a grocery stores in Voss in Norway, the relative diversion ratios d = dij/dji, i≠j, were as low as 
1:10, while relative market shares (sales), s = si/sj, i≠j, were down to 1:3. The correlation between d and s is 
about 0.4 supporting the intuition that a larger store picks up a larger fraction of customers than do a smaller 
store. See L. Mathiesen, Ø. A. Nilsen, and L. Sørgard (Volume 31): Merger simulations with observed diversion 
ratios, INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, 83–91, 2011. 
10 This observation is also made in merger simulations. 
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the middle graph (d = 1) in Figure 2a.11 m-e values below the graph give FP. Setting d = 0.5 
or d = 2, provide similar graphs, respectively below and above the one corresponding to d = 1. 
These results can be recast in d-e-space as in Figure 2b. 
 
 
 
   Figure 2a     Figure 2b 
Figure 2: False positive below curves in m-e-space.            
 
4. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The UPP framework has been presented as a very useful tool for screening mergers. One 
concern is that the specific UPP test proposed by Farrell and Shapiro, called the UPP1 test, is 
biased towards giving false negatives. This is problematic for a test used for screening, since 
it could clear anti-competitive mergers. In this article we have shown that, contrary to what 
has been claimed, the test can lead to false positives. This will be true if the merging firms are 
sufficiently asymmetric, for example asymmetries in diversion ratios in each direction 
between the two merging firms’ products. 
 
This result illustrates that the specific test provided by Farrell and Shapiro is less problematic 
for a screening purpose then earlier indicated. On the other hand, a false positive is more 
problematic in the full fledge analysis of the anti-competitive effect of a merger since then it 
is less likely that the error is corrected later on. It is thus more problematic than earlier 
indicated to apply this test in the second phase of a merger procedure. There are thus good 
reasons for applying the proposed UPP test only for screening purposes.   
                                                 
11 With d = 1, E1 = 0.101 and E2 = 0,121 giving e = 0.8333, define the border-line. That is, smaller E1 and/or 
larger E2 produce false positive.  
8 
 
 
 Issued in the series Discussion Papers 2011 
 
 
 
2011 
 
 
01/11 January,  Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge, Kjetil Bjorvatn, and Bertil Tungodden, 
“Human and financial capital for microenterprise development: Evidence 
from a field and lab experiment.” 
 
02/11 February, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume, “Quality 
competition with profit constraints: do non-profit firms provide higher quality 
than for-profit firms?” 
 
03/11 February, Gernot Doppelhofer and Melvyn Weeks, “Robust Growth 
Determinants”. 
 
04/11 February, Manudeep Bhuller, Magne Mogstad, and Kjell G. Salvanes, “Life-
Cycle Bias and the Returns to Schooling in Current and Lifetime Earnings”. 
 
05/11 March, Knut Nygaard, "Forced board changes: Evidence from Norway". 
 
06/11 March, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y., “Negotiation under possible third party 
settlement”. 
 
07/11 April, Fred Schroyen, “Attitudes towards income risk in the presence of 
quantity constraints”. 
 
08/11 April, Craig Brett and Laurence Jacquet, “Workforce or Workfare?” 
 
09/11 May, Bjørn Basberg, “A Crisis that Never Came. The Decline of the European 
Antarctic Whaling Industry in the 1950s and -60s”. 
 
10/11 June, Joseph A. Clougherty, Klaus Gugler, and Lars Sørgard, “Cross-Border 
Mergers and Domestic Wages: Integrating Positive ‘Spillover’ Effects and 
Negative ‘Bargaining’ Effects”. 
 
11/11 July, Øivind A. Nilsen, Arvid Raknerud, and Terje Skjerpen, “Using the 
Helmert-transformation to reduce dimensionality in a mixed model: 
Application to a wage equation with worker and …rm heterogeneity”. 
 
12/11 July, Karin Monstad, Carol Propper, and Kjell G. Salvanes, “Is teenage 
motherhood contagious? Evidence from a Natural Experiment”. 
 
 13/11 August, Kurt R. Brekke, Rosella Levaggi, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune 
Straume, “Patient Mobility, Health Care Quality and Welfare”. 
 
14/11 July, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y.,  “Fairness motivation in bargaining”. 
 
15/11 September, Sigbjørn Birkeland d.y, Alexander Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, 
and Bertil Tungodden, “Immoral criminals? An experimental study of social 
preferences among prisoners”. 
 
16/11 September, Hans Jarle Kind, Guttorm Schjelderup, and Frank Stähler, 
“Newspaper Differentiation and Investments in Journalism: The Role of Tax 
Policy”. 
 
17/11 Gregory Corcos, Massimo Del Gatto, Giordano Mion, and Gianmarco I.P. 
Ottaviano, “Productivity and Firm Selection: Quantifying the "New" Gains 
from Trade”. 
 
18/11 Grant R. McDermott and Øivind Anti Nilsen, “Electricity Prices, River 
Temperatures and Cooling Water Scarcity”. 
 
19/11 Pau Olivella and Fred Schroyen, “Multidimensional screening in a 
monopolistic insurance market”. 
 
20/11 Liam Brunt, “Property rights and economic growth: evidence from a natural 
experiment”. 
 
21/11 Pau Olivella and Fred Schroyen, “Multidimensional screening in a 
monopolistic insurance market: proofs”. 
 
22/11 Roger Bivand, “After “Raising the Bar”: applied maximum likelihood 
estimation of families of models in spatial econometrics”. 
 
23/11 Roger Bivand, “Geocomputation and open source software:components and 
software stacks”. 
 
24/11 Simon P.Anderson, Øystein Foros, Hans Jarle Kind and Martin Peitz, “Media 
market concentration, advertising levels, and ad prices”. 
 
25/11 Liam Brunt, Johs Lerner, and Tom Nicholas, “Inducement Prizes and 
Innovation”. 
 
26/11 Øivind Anti Nilsen and Katrine Holm Reiso, “Scarring effects of 
unemployment”. 
 2012 
 
 
01/12 February, Ola Honningdal Grytten, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism the Haugian Way”. 
 
02/12 February, Alexander W. Cappelen, Rune Jansen Hagen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, 
and Bertil Tungodden, «Do non-enforceable contracts matter? Evidence from 
an international lab experiment”. 
 
03/12 February, Alexander W. Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden, “Tax policy and 
fair inequality”. 
 
04/12 March, Mette Ejrnæs and Astrid Kunze, «Work and Wage Dynamics around 
Childbirth”. 
 
05/12 March, Lars Mathiesen, “Price patterns resulting from different producer 
behavior in spatial equilibrium”. 
 
06/12 March, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume, “Hospital 
competition with soft budgets”. 
 
07/12 March,  Alexander W. Cappelen and Bertil Tungodden, “Heterogeneity in 
fairness views - a challenge to the mutualistic approach?” 
 
08/12 March, Tore Ellingsen and Eirik Gaard Kristiansen, “Paying for Staying: 
Managerial Contracts and the Retention Motive”. 
 
09/12 March, Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani, and Odd Rune Straume, “Can 
competition reduce quality?” 
 
10/12 April, Espen Bratberg, Øivind Anti Nilsen, and Kjell Vaage, “Is Recipiency of 
Disability Pension Hereditary?” 
 
11/12 May, Lars Mathiesen, Øivind Anti Nilsen, and Lars Sørgard, “A Note on 
Upward Pricing Pressure: The possibility of false positives”. 
 
 
Norges
Handelshøyskole
Norwegian School of Economics 
NHH
Helleveien 30
NO-5045 Bergen
Norway
Tlf/Tel: +47 55 95 90 00
Faks/Fax: +47 55 95 91 00
nhh.postmottak@nhh.no
www.nhh.no
